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S T A T E S
Can Congress Make States
Amenable to Suit in Federal Court
for Claims of Patent Infringement?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 427-430. © 1999 American Bar Association.
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Editor's Note: Because the respon-
dents' briefs were not available
before Preview's deadline, this arti-
cle was based on the petitioner's
brief and lower court opinions.
ISSUE
Does the Eleventh Amendment bar
a suit against a nonconsenting state
in federal court for patent
infringement?
FACTS
Since 1987, College Savings Bank
has sold a certificate of deposit
known as the CollegeSure CD. The
purpose of the CollegeSure CD is to
help individuals save for college
expenses. College Savings guaran-
tees returns sufficient to fund the
uncertain future cost of education.
The CollegeSure CD is administered
using an apparatus and methods
described in College Savings' patent.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board adminis-
ters a similar investment program
intended to aid individuals in fund-
ing the cost of Florida public col-
leges and universities.
Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School, Milwaukee, Wis.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377. Prof. Grenig is the
co-author of West's Handbook
of Federal Civil Discovery
and Disclosure.
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In 1994, College Savings brought a
patent infringement action against
Florida Prepaid pursuant to the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(h), 296), claiming that
Florida Prepaid had directly and
indirectly infringed College Savings'
patent. Florida Prepaid moved to
dismiss College Savings' claim on
the ground that it was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. Florida
Prepaid argued that the Patent
Remedy Act was an unconstitution-
al attempt by Congress to use its
Article I powers under the Patent
Clause to abrogate state sovereign
immunity and to enlarge the federal
courts' Article III jurisdiction. The
United States then intervened as of
right to defend the constitutionality
of the Patent Remedy Act.
Concluding that Florida Prepaid was
an arm of the state of Florida for
purposes of immunity from suit, the
(Continued on Page 428)
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district court nonetheless denied
Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss.
It ruled that Congress had unam-
biguously abrogated the states' sov-
ereign immunity in the Patent
Remedy Act and had acted pursuant
to a valid exercise of power under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 948
F.Supp. 400 (D.N.J.1996).
Because a denial of an assertion of
sovereign immunity is immediately
appealable, Florida Prepaid appealed
the dismissal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit held that Congress
had clearly expressed its intent to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity
in patent infringement actions and
that this abrogation of immunity
was within Congress' power under
the Fourteenth Amendment's
enforcement provision. 148 F.3d
1343 (Fed.Cir. 1998). The Supreme
Court of the United States granted
Florida Prepaid's petition for certio-
rari. 119 S.Ct. 790 (1999).
College Savings later brought anoth-
er action against Florida Prepaid in
1995 alleging that Florida Prepaid
had violated Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
College Savings claimed that Florida
Prepaid had made misstatements
about Florida Prepaid's tuition sav-
ings plans in its brochures and
annual reports. That suit is the sub-
ject of a separate appeal also before
the Supreme Court this month and
is discussed elsewhere in this issue.
College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, Docket No. 98-149.
CASE ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Amendment provides
that the "Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equi-
ty, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Determining whether
Congress has abrogated the states'
constitutionally secured immunity
from suit in federal court is a two-
step inquiry: (1) determining
whether Congress has unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate
immunity, and (2) examining
whether in purporting to abrogate
immunity, Congress has over-
stepped its constitutional authority.
See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989) (evidence
of congressional intent to abrogate
state sovereign immunity must be
both unequivocal and textual);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
In 1990, the Federal Circuit held
that the Patent Act contained no
such unequivocal statement of
intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v.
Florida Dept. of Transp., 919 F.2d
726 (Fed.Cir. 1990); Chew v.
California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed.Cir.
1990). In response to these deci-
sions, Congress amended the patent
laws in 1994 to explicitly declare
that states may be sued for patent
infringement in the federal courts.
See the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification
Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296.
Before the 1994 amendment, the
Act stated only that "whoever"
without authority made, used, or
sold a patented invention infringed
the patent.
Supreme Court decisions have
established that Eleventh
Amendment immunity is not
absolute. See Kevin Worthen,
"Federalism: State Immunity from
Tribal Suits Enforcing the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act: Indian
Rights in the New Era of
Federalism," Preview of United
States Supreme Court Cases 19, 20
(1995). The Supreme Court has
held that by ratifying the
Constitution, states consented to
federal court suits brought by the
United States and other states.
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
521 (1892) (pitting the United
States against a state); South
Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S.
286 (1904) (pitting one state
against another state).
In another limitation, the Court has
held that the Eleventh
Amendment's immunity does not
bar federal court actions that are
brought to enjoin state officials
from enforcing state laws that con-
flict with the United States
Constitution. Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
In a third limitation, the Supreme
Court held that at least some con-
stitutional provisions grant
Congress the authority to subject
states to suit in federal court so
long as Congress makes its intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity
unmistakably clear. Fitzpatrick v.
Blitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)
(Fourteenth Amendment abrogates
state sovereign immunity).
However, in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), the Supreme Court held
that Congress could not abrogate
the sovereign immunity of the
states when acting pursuant to its
plenary power to regulate com-
merce under Article I of the
Constitution. The Court said that
by ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states only agreed
to waive their Eleventh Amendment
immunity with respect to the rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In recognizing the
states' broad Eleventh Amendment
immunity from the authority of the
federal judiciary, the Court left
open the question of what recourse
would be available to a patent or
copyright holder if a state misap-
propriated a patent or copyright.
Issue No. 7428
Since Seminole Tribe, the only leg-
islative tool the Supreme Court has
recognized for abrogating the sover-
eign immunity of the states is
Congress' power to enforce the sub-
stantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment is a clear
limitation on the authority of the
states and fundamentally has
altered the balance of state and fed-
eral power struck by the
Constitution. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
any state from making or enforcing
any law abridging the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United
States; from depriving any person of
life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; and from denying
citizens equal protection of the
laws. Section 5 of the Amendment
grants Congress the power to
enforce the prohibitions of Section
1 by "appropriate legislation."
Florida Prepaid argues that the
objective of the Patent Remedy Act
is impermissible because, if the Act
were upheld, Congress would be
able to abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its Article I
power, which is the exact result that
the Supreme Court proscribed in
Seminole Tribe. Pointing out that
the "property" protected by
Congress here is a federally created
property, Florida Prepaid asserts
that Congress cannot accomplish
indirectly through the Fourteenth
Amendment precisely what it is for-
bidden from doing through Article I.
See Chavez v. Arte Public Press,
139 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 1998)
(Congress could not abrogate state's
immunity to suit for copyright
infringement through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353
(3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119
S.Ct. 790 (1999) (right to be free of
unfair competition under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act does not
implicate property right under
Fourteenth Amendment).
The Federal Circuit, however, rea-
soned that because the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted after the
Eleventh Amendment, it expressly
qualifies the principle of sovereign
immunity. Although there may be
some property interests that are not
protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it said that such cen-
tral and historic fixtures in the
realm of property as patents surely
warrant protection from deprivation
by the states. It noted that patents
were considered property at the
time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
Florida Prepaid also asserts that the
goal of the Patent Reform Act,
which is to prevent states from
infringing patents or obliging them
to compensate the patent owner
when they do, is not a legitimate
objective under the Fourteenth
Amendment. It suggests that abroga-
tion of a state's immunity from suit
under the Patent Remedy Act would
apply only to those states that fail to
provide a remedy for compensation
for patent infringement by the state
or that provide a remedy of such
inconsequence as to be illusory.
The Federal Circuit, on the other
hand, reasoned that in enacting the
Patent Remedy Act, Congress prop-
erly relied on its power to abrogate
state immunity pursuant to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
stressed that protecting a privately
held patent from infringement by a
state is a legitimate congressional
objective under the Fourteenth
Amendment. It said that in subject-
ing the states to suit in federal court
for patent infringement, Congress
sought to prevent states from
depriving patent owners of their
property without due process
through infringing acts.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997) (Justices Scalia and
Stevens concurring in part; Justices
O'Connor, Breyer, Souter dissent-
ing) the Supreme Court examined
Congress' enforcement power under
Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Kennedy explained that
legislation that deters or remedies a
constitutional violation can fall
within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment even if in
the process it prohibits conduct that
is not itself unconstitutional and
intrudes into legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to
the states. However, he stated that
Congress' enforcement power under
the Fourteenth Amendment extends
only to the "enforcing" provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to Justice Kennedy,
Congress has been given the power
to "enforce," not the power to deter-
mine what constitutes a constitu-
tional violation. The Court therefore
concluded that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.) exceed-
ed Congress' Section 5 enforcement
powers. The Court declared that
Congress' enforcement power did
not extend to include "the power to
decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restric-
tions on the States."
Noting that the line between mea-
sures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and mea-
sures that make a substantive
change in the governing law is not
easy to discern, the Court said that
Congress must have wide latitude in
determining where it lies. The Court
observed that there must be a pro-
portionality between the injury to
(Continued on Page 430)
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be prevented or remedies and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking
such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation
and effect.
Relying on City of Boerne, Florida
Prepaid says that the Patent
Remedy Act cannot be upheld
because it does not target unconsti-
tutional state conduct and lacks
congruity with the means to be
achieved. It further argues that no
unconstitutional state conduct can
be remedied or prevented where
states already afford patent holders
due process of law. Florida Prepaid
concludes that exposing states to
lost profits, treble damages, and
attorney fees in suits brought in fed-
eral court is both unduly intrusive
and harmful.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case and the companion case
involving the same parties present
the Supreme Court with very signifi-
cant issues relating to our legal sys-
tem, in particular the relationship
between the states and the federal
government. The Supreme Court is
given the opportunity to clarify or
limit its recent decisions in
Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne.
The Court may resolve the unset-
tled question of what is the recourse
of a patent or copyright holder if a
state misappropriates a patent or
copyright. It may also describe the
extent of Congress' power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity as
protected by the Eleventh
Amendment.
If the Court holds that the Patent
Remedy Act does not abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment, then
holders of valuable property rights
protected by patents will be able to
seek damages for violations of those
rights in federal courts-even if the
violator is a state.
If the Supreme Court holds that
Congress does not have the power
to make the states amenable to suit
in federal court for claims of patent
infringement, states would be pro-
tected from exposure to suits for
lost profits, treble damages, and
attorney fees. While such a holding
could have a significant impact on
the value of patents, patent holders
would not be completely without
remedies for infringement. Suits
against states for damages for viola-
tion of patent rights would depend
on state law providing remedies for
taking of property. In addition,
patent holders could pursue actions
in federal court for injunctive relief
under the authority of Ex parte
Young.
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